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Abstract—In the recent time, the problem of protecting privacy in 
statistical data before they are published has become a pressing 
one. Many reliable studies have been accomplished, and loads of 
solutions have been proposed. 
Though, all these researches take into consideration only the 
problem of protecting individual privacy, i.e., privacy of a single 
person, household, etc. In our previous articles, we addressed a 
completely new type of anonymity problems. We introduced a 
novel kind of anonymity to achieve in statistical data and called it 
group anonymity. 
In this paper, we aim at summarizing and generalizing our 
previous results, propose a complete mathematical description of 
how to provide group anonymity, and illustrate it with a couple 
of real-life examples. 
Keywords-group anonymity; microfiles; wavelet transform 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout mankind’s history, people always collected 
large amounts of demographical data. Though, until the very 
recent time, such huge data sets used to be inaccessible for 
publicity. And what is more, even if some potential intruder got 
an access to such paper-written data, it would be way too hard 
for him to analyze them properly! 
But, as information technologies develop more, a greater 
number of specialists (to wide extent) gain access to large 
statistical datasets to perform various kinds of analysis. For that 
matter, different data mining systems help to determine data 
features, patterns, and properties. 
As a matter of fact, in today world, in many cases 
population census datasets (usually referred to as microfiles) 
contain this or that kind of sensitive information about 
respondents. Disclosing such information can violate a person’s 
privacy, so convenient precautions should be taken beforehand. 
For many years now, mostly every paper in major of 
providing data anonymity deals with a problem of protecting an 
individual’s privacy within a statistical dataset. As opposed to 
it, we have previously introduced a totally new kind of 
anonymity in a microfile which we called group anonymity. In 
this paper, we aim at gathering and systematizing all our works 
published in the previous years. Also, we would like to 
generalize our previous approaches and propose an integrated 
survey of group anonymity problem. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Individual Anonymity 
We understand by individual data anonymity a property of 
information about an individual to be unidentifiable within a 
dataset. 
There exist two basic ways to protect information about a 
single person. The first one is actually protecting the data in its 
formal sense, using data encryption, or simply restricting 
access to them. Of course, this technique is of no interest to 
statistics and affiliated fields. 
The other approach lies in modifying initial microfile data 
such way that it is still useful for the majority of statistical 
researches, but is protected enough to conceal any sensitive 
information about a particular respondent. Methods and 
algorithms for achieving this are commonly known as privacy 
preserving data publishing (PPDP) techniques. The Free 
Haven Project [1] provides a very well prepared anonymity 
bibliography concerning these topics. 
In [2], the authors investigated all main methods used in 
PPDP, and introduced a systematic view of them. In this 
subsection, we will only slightly characterize the most popular 
PPDP methods of providing individual data anonymity. These 
methods are also widely known as statistical disclosure control 
(SDC) techniques. 
All SDC methods fall into two categories. They can be 
either perturbative or non-perturbative. The first ones achieve 
data anonymity by introducing some data distortion, whereas 
the other ones anonymize the data without altering them. 
Possibly the simplest perturbative proposition is to add 
some noise to initial dataset [3]. This is called data 
randomization. If this noise is independent of the values in a 
microfile, and is relatively small, then it is possible to perform 
statistical analysis which yields rather close results compared to 
those ones obtained using initial dataset. Though, this solution 
is not quite efficient. As it was shown in [4], if there are other 
sources available aside from our microfile with intersecting 
information, it will be very possible to violate privacy. 
Another option is to reach data k-anonymity. The core of 
this approach is to somehow ensure that all combinations of 
microfile attribute values are associated with at least k 
respondents. This result can be obtained using various methods 
[5, 6]. 
Yet another technique is to swap confidential microfile 
attribute values between different individuals [7]. 
Non-perturbative SDC methods are mainly represented by 
data recoding (data enlargement) and data suppression 
(removing the data from the original microfile) [6]. 
In previous years, novel methods evolved, e.g., matrix 
decomposition [8], or factorization [9]. But, all of them aim at 
preserving individual privacy only. 
B. Group Anonymity 
Despite the fact that PPDP field is developing rather 
rapidly, there exists another, completely different privacy issue 
which hasn’t been studied well enough yet. Speaking more 
precisely, it is another kind of anonymity to be achieved in a 
microfile. 
We called this kind of anonymity group anonymity. The 
formal definition will be given further on in this paper, but in a 
way this kind of anonymity aims at protecting such data 
features and patterns which cannot be determined by analyzing 
standalone respondents. 
The problem of providing group anonymity was initially 
addressed in [10]. Though, there has not been proposed any 
feasible solution to it then. 
In [11, 12], we presented a rather effective method for 
solving some particular group anonymity tasks. We showed its 
main features, and discussed several real-life practical 
examples. 
The most complete survey of group anonymity tasks and 
their solutions as of time this paper is being written is [13]. 
There, we tried to gather up all existing works of ours in one 
place, and also added new examples that reflect interesting 
peculiarities of our method. Still, [13] lacks a systematized 
view and reminds more of a collection of separate articles 
rather than of an integrated study. 
That is why in this paper we set a task of embedding all 
known approaches to solving group anonymity problem into 
complete and consistent group anonymity theory. 
III. FORMAL DEFINITIONS 
To start with, let us propose some necessary definitions. 
Definition 1. By microdata we will understand various data 
about respondents (which might equally be persons, 
households, enterprises, and so on). 
Definition 2. Respectively, we will consider a microfile to 
be microdata reduced to one file of attributive records 
concerning each single respondent. 
A microfile can be without any complications presented in 
a matrix form. In such a matrix M, each row corresponds to a 
particular respondent, and each column stands for a specific 
attribute. The matrix itself is shown in Table I. 
 
 
TABLE I.  MICROFILE DATA IN A MATRIX FORM 
  
Attributes 
1u  2u  … u  
R
e
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
 
1r  11  12  … 1  
2r  21  22  … 2  
… … … … … 
r  1  2  …   
 
In such a matrix, we can define different classes of 
attributes. 
Definition 3. An identifier is a microfile attribute which 
unambiguously determines a certain respondent in a microfile. 
From a privacy protection point of view, identifiers are the 
most security-intensive attributes. The only possible way to 
prevent privacy violation is to completely eliminate them from 
a microfile. That is why, we will further on presume that a 
microfile is always de-personalized, i.e., it does not contain any 
identifiers. 
In terms of group anonymity problem, we need to define 
such attributes whose distribution is of a big privacy concern 
and has to be thoroughly considered. 
Definition 4. We will call an element ( ) ,vk vs S  1, ,vk l  
μvl  , where vS  is a subset of a Cartesian product 
1 2
...
tv v v
u u u    (see Table I), a vital value combination. Each 
element of ( )v
ks  is called a vital value. Each jvu , 1,j t  is 
called a vital attribute. 
In other words, vital attributes reflect characteristic 
properties needed to define a subset of respondents to be 
protected. 
But, it is always convenient to present multidimensional 
data in a one-dimensional form to simplify its modification. To 
be able to accomplish that, we have to define yet another class 
of attributes. 
Definition 5. We will call en element 
( ) ,pk ps S  
1, , μp pk l l  , where pS  is a subset of microfile data 
elements corresponding to the p
th
 attribute, a parameter value. 
The attribute itself is called a parameter attribute. 
Parameter values are usually used to somehow arrange 
microfile data in a particular order. In most cases, resultant data 
representation contains some sensitive information which is 
highly recommended to be protected. (We will delve into this 
problem in the next section.) 
Definition 6. A group ( , )G V P is a set of attributes 
consisting of several vital attributes  1 2, , ..., lV V V V  and a 
parameter attribute P, ,jP V  1,...,j l .  
Now, we can formally define a group anonymity task. 
Group Anonymity Definition. The task of providing data 
group anonymity lies in modifying initial dataset for each 
group ( , ),i i iG V P  1,...,i k  such way that sensitive data 
features become totally confided. 
In the next section, we will propose a generic algorithm for 
providing group anonymity in some most common practical 
cases. 
IV. GENERAL APPROACH TO PROVIDING GROUP 
ANONYMITY 
According to the Group Anonymity Definition, initial 
dataset M should be perturbed separately for each group to 
ensure protecting specific features for each of them. 
Before performing any data modifications, it is always 
necessary to preliminarily define what features of a particular 
group need to be hidden. So, we need to somehow transform 
initial matrix into another representation useful for such 
identification. Besides, this representation should also provide 
more explicit view of how to modify the microfile to achieve 
needed group features. 
All this leads to the following definitions.  
Definition 7. We will understand by a goal representation 
  (M, G) of a dataset M with respect to a group G such a 
dataset (which could be of any dimension) that represents 
particular features of a group within initial microfile in a way 
appropriate for providing group anonymity. 
We will discuss different forms of goal representations a bit 
later on in this section. 
Having obtained goal representation of a microfile dataset, 
it is almost always possible to modify it such way that security-
intensive peculiarities of a dataset become concealed. In this 
case, it is said we obtain a modified goal representation 
'  (M, G) of initial dataset M. 
After that, we need to somehow map our modified goal 
representation to initial dataset resulting in a modified 
microdata M
*
. Of course, it is not necessary that such data 
modifications lead to any feasible solution. But, as we will 
discuss it in the next subsections, if to pick specific mappings 
and data representations, it is possible to provide group 
anonymity in any microfile. 
So, a generic scheme of providing group anonymity is as 
follows: 
1) Construct a (depersonalized) microfile M representing 
statistical data to be processed. 
2) Define one or several groups ( , ),i i iG V P  1,...,i k  
representing categories of respondents to be protected. 
3) For each i from 1 to k: 
a) Choosing data representation: Pick a goal 
representation i  (M, iG ) for a group ( , )i i iG V P . 
b) Performing data mapping: Define a mapping function 
 : M  i  (M, iG ) (called goal mapping function) and 
obtain needed goal representation of a dataset. 
c) Performing goal representation’s modification: 
Define a functional  : i  (M, iG )  'i  (M, iG ) (also 
called modifying functional) and obtain a modified goal 
representation. 
d) Obtaining the modified microfile. Define an inverse 
goal mapping function 1 : 'i  (M, iG ) M
*
 and obtain a 
modified microfile. 
4) Prepare the modified microfile for publishing. 
Now, let us discuss some of these algorithm steps a bit in 
detail. 
A. Different Ways to Construct a Goal Representation 
In general, each particular case demands developing certain 
data representation models to suit the stated requirements the 
best way. Although, there are loads of real-life examples where 
some common models might be applied with a reasonable 
effect. 
In our previous works, we drew a particular attention to one 
special data goal representation, namely, a goal signal. The 
goal signal is a one-dimensional numerical array 
1 2( , ,..., )m      representing statistical features of a group. It 
can consist of values obtained in different ways, but we will 
defer this discussion for some paragraphs. 
In the meantime, let us try to figure out what particular 
features of a goal signal might turn out to be security-intensive. 
To be able to do that, we need to consider its graphical 
representation which we will call a goal chart. In [13], we 
summarized the most important goal chart features and 
proposed some approaches to modifying them. In order not to 
repeat ourselves, we will only outline the most important ones: 
1) Extremums. In most cases, it is the most sensitive 
information; we need to transit such extremums from one 
signal position to another (or, which is also completely 
convenient, create some new extremums, so that initial ones 
just “dissolve”). 
2) Statistical features. Such features as signal mean value 
and standard deviation might be of a big importance, unless a 
corresponding parameter attribute is nominal (it will become 
clear why in a short time). 
3) Frequency spectrum. This feature might be rather 
interesting if a goal signal contains some parts repeated 
cyclically. 
Coming from a particular aim to be achieved, one can 
choose the most suitable modifying functional   to redistribute 
the goal signal. 
Let us understand how a goal signal can be constructed in 
some widely spread real-life group anonymity problems. 
In many cases, we can count up all the respondents in a 
group with a certain pair of vital value combination and a 
parameter value, and arrange them in any order proper for a 
parameter attribute. For instance, if parameter values stand for 
a person’s age, and vital value combinations reflect his or her 
yearly income, then we will obtain a goal signal representing 
quantities of people with a certain income distributed by their 
age. In some situations, this distribution could lead to unveiling 
some restricted information, so, a group anonymity problem 
would evidently arise. 
Such a goal signal is called a quantity 
signal
1 2( , ,..., )mq q q q . It provides a quantitative statistical 
distribution of group members from initial microfile. 
Though, as it was shown in [12], sometimes absolute 
quantities do not reflect real situations, because they do not 
take into account all the information given in a microfile. A 
much better solution for such cases is to build up a 
concentration signal: 
 1 2
1 2
1 2
( , ,..., ) , ,..., mm
m
qq q
c c c c
 
   
   
 
In (1), 
i , 1,...,i m  stand for the quantities of 
respondents in a microfile from a group defined by a superset 
for our vital value combinations. This can be explained on a 
simple example. Information about people with AIDS 
distributed by regions of a state can be valid only if it is 
represented in a relative form. In this case, 
iq  would stand for 
a number of ill people in the i
th
 region, whereas 
i  could 
possibly stand for the whole number of people in the i
th
 region. 
And yet another form of a goal signal comes to light when 
processing comparative data. A representative example is as 
follows: if we know concentration signals built separately for 
young males of military age and young females of the same 
age, then, maximums in their difference might point at some 
restricted military bases. 
In such cases, we deal with two concentration signals 
(1) (1) (1) (1)
1 2( , ,..., )mc c c c  (also called a main concentration 
signal) and (2) (2) (2) (2)
1 2( , ,..., )mc c c c  (a subordinate 
concentration signal). Then, the goal signal takes a form of a 
concentration difference signal    
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1 1 2 2( , ,..., )m mc c c c c c    . 
In the next subsection, we will address the problem of 
picking a suitable modifying functional, and also consider one 
of its possible forms already successfully applied in our 
previous papers. 
B. Picking Appropriate Modifying Functional 
Once again, there can be created way too many unlike 
modifying functionals, each of them taking into consideration 
these or those requirements set by a concrete group anonymity 
problem definition. In this subsection, we will look a bit in 
detail at two such functionals. 
So, let us pay attention to the first goal chart feature stated 
previously, which is in most cases the feature we would like to 
protect. Let us discuss the problem of altering extremums in an 
initial goal chart. 
In general, we might perform this operation quite 
arbitrarily. The particular scheme of such extremums 
redistribution would generally depend on the quantity signal 
nature, sense of parameter values, and correct data interpreting. 
But, as things usually happen in statistics, we might as well 
want to guarantee that data utility wouldn’t reduce much. By 
data utility preserving we will understand the situation when 
the modified goal signal yields similar, or even the same, 
results when performing particular statistical (but not 
exclusively) analysis. 
Obviously, altering the goal signal completely off-hand 
without any additional precautions taken wouldn’t be very 
convenient from the data utility preserving point of view. 
Hopefully, there exist two quite dissimilar, thought powerful 
techniques for preserving some goal chart features. 
The first one was proposed in [14]. Its main idea is to 
normalize the output signal using such transformation that both 
mean value and standard deviation of a signal remain stable. 
Surely, this is not ideal utility preserving. But, the signal 
obtained this way at least yields the same results when 
performing basic statistical analysis. So, the formula goes as 
follows: 

*
* *
*
( )
 
      
 
 
In (2), 
1
1 m
i
im 
   , * *
1
1 m
i
im 
   , 
2
1
( )
1
m
i
i
m

  
 


, 
* * 2
* 1
( )
1
m
i
i
m

  
 


. 
The second method of modifying the signal was initially 
proposed in [11], and was later on developed in [12, 13]. Its 
basic idea lies in applying wavelet transform to perturbing the 
signal, with some slight restrictions necessary for preserving 
data utility: 

1
, , , ,( ) ( ) ( )k i k i j i j i
i j k i
t a t d t

       
In (3), ,φk i  stands for shifted and sampled scaling 
functions, and ,j i  represents shifted and sampled wavelet 
functions. As we showed in our previous researches, we can 
gain group anonymity by modifying approximation coefficients 
,k ia . At the same time, if we don’t modify detail coefficients 
,j id  we can preserve signal’s frequency characteristics 
necessary for different kinds of statistical analysis. 
More than that, we can always preserve the signal’s mean 
value without any influence on its extremums: 
 * * *
1 1
θ θ θ θ
m m
fin mod i mod i
i i 
 
  
 
   
In the next section, we will study several real-life practical 
examples, and will try to provide group anonymity for 
appropriate datasets. Until then, we won’t delve deeper into 
wavelet transforms theory. 
C. The Problem of Minimum Distortion when Applying 
Inverse Goal Mapping Function 
Having obtained modified goal signal *θ fin , we have no 
other option but to modify our initial dataset M, so that its 
contents correspond to *θ fin . 
It is obvious that, since group anonymity has been provided 
with respect to only a single respondent group, modifying the 
dataset M almost inevitably will lead to introducing some level 
of data distortion to it. In this subsection, we will try to 
minimize such distortion by picking sufficient inverse goal 
mapping functions. 
At first, we need some more definitions. 
Definition 8. We will call microfile M attributes influential 
ones if their distribution plays a great role for researchers. 
Obviously, vital attributes are influential by definition. 
Keeping in mind this definition, let us think over a 
particular procedure of mapping the modified goal signal *θ fin  
to a modified microfile M
*
. The most adequate solution, in our 
opinion, implies swapping parameter values between pairs of 
somewhat close respondents. We might interpret this operation 
as “transiting” respondents between two different groups 
(which is in fact the case). 
But, an evident problem arises. We need to know how to 
define whether two respondents are “close” or not. This could 
be done if to measure such closeness using influential metric 
[13]: 

  
2
1
2
1
( ) *( )
( , *)
( ) *( )
( ), *( ) .
ord
nom
n
p p
p
p p p
n
k k k
k
r I r I
InfM r r
r I r I
r J r J


 
     
  


 
In (5), Here, pI  stands for the p
th
 ordinal influential 
attribute (making a total of ordn ). Respectively, kJ  stands for 
the k
th
 nominal influential attribute (making a total of nomn ). 
Functional ( )r   stands for a record’s r specified attribute value. 
Operator 1 2( , )v v  is equal to 1  if values 1v  and 2v  represent 
one category, and 2 , if it is not so. Coefficients p  and k  
should be taken coming from importance of a certain attribute 
(for those ones not to be changed at all they ought to be as big 
as possible, and for those that are not important they could be 
zero). 
With the help of this metric, it is not too hard to outline the 
generic strategy of performing inverse data mapping. One 
needs to search for every pair of respondents yielding 
minimum influential metric value, and swap corresponding 
parameter values. This procedure should be carried out until the 
modified goal signal *θ fin  is completely mapped to M
*
. 
This strategy seems to be NP-hard, so, the problem of 
developing more computationally effective inverse goal 
mapping functions remains open. 
V. SOME PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF PROVIDING GROUP 
ANONYMITY  
In this subsection, we will discuss two practical examples 
built upon real data to show the proposed group anonymity 
providing technique in action. 
According to the scheme introduced in Section IV, the first 
thing to accomplish is to compile a microfile representing the 
data we would like to work with. For both of our examples, we 
decided to take 5-Percent Public Use Microdata Sample Files 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau [15] concerning the 2000 
U.S. census of population and housing microfile data. But, 
since this dataset is huge, we decided to limit ourselves with 
analyzing the data on the state of California only. 
The next step (once again, we will carry it out the same way 
for both examples) is to define group(s) to be protected. In this 
paper, we will follow [11], i.e. we will set a task of protecting 
military personnel distribution by the places they work at. Such 
a task has a very important practical meaning. The thing is that 
extremums in goal signals (both quantity and concentration 
ones) with a very high probability mark out the sites of military 
cantonments. In some cases, these cantonments aren’t likely to 
become widely known (especially to some potential 
adversaries). 
So, to complete the second step of our algorithm, we take 
“Military service” attribute as a vital one. This is a categorical 
attribute, with integer values ranging from 0 to 4. For our task 
definition, we decided to take one vital value, namely, “1” 
which stands for “Active duty”. 
But, we also need to pick an appropriate parameter 
attribute. Since we aim at redistributing military servicemen by 
different territories, we took “Place of Work Super-PUMA” as 
a parameter attribute. The values of this categorical attribute 
represent codes for Californian statistical areas. In order to 
simplify our problem a bit, we narrowed the set of this 
attribute’s values down to the following ones: 06010, 06020, 
06030, 06040, 06060, 06070, 06080, 06090, 06130, 06170, 
06200, 06220, 06230, 06409, 06600, and 06700. All these area 
codes correspond to border, island, and coastal statistical areas. 
From this point, we need to make a decision about the goal 
representation of our microdata. To show peculiarities of 
different kinds of such representations, we will discuss at least 
two of them in this section. The first one would be the quantity 
signal, and the other one would be its concentration analogue. 
A. Quantity Group Anonymity Problem 
So, having all necessary attributes defined, it is not too hard 
to count up all the military men in each statistical area, and 
gather them up in a numerical array sorted in an ascending 
order by parameter values. In our case, this quantity signal 
looks as follows: 
q=(19, 12, 153, 71, 13, 79, 7, 33, 16, 270, 812, 135, 241, 
14, 60, 4337). 
The graphical representation of this signal is presented in 
Fig. 1a. 
As we can clearly see, there is a very huge extremum at the 
last signal position. So, we need to somehow eliminate it, but 
simultaneously preserve important signal features. In this 
example, we will use wavelet transforms to transit extremums 
to another region, so, according to the previous section, we will 
be able to preserve high-frequency signal spectrum. 
As it was shown in [11], we need to change signal 
approximation coefficients in order to modify its distribution. 
To obtain approximation coefficients of any signal, we need to 
decompose it using appropriate wavelet filters (both high- and 
low-frequency ones). We won’t explain in details here how to 
perform all the wavelet transform steps (refer to [12] for 
details), though, we will consider only those steps which are 
necessary for completing our task. 
So, to decompose the quantity signal q by two levels using 
Daubechies second-order low-pass wavelet decomposition 
filter l    
1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3
, , ,
4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
    
  
 
, we need to 
perform the following operations: 
2a  = 2 2( )q l l    = (2272.128, 136.352, 158.422, 
569.098). 
By 
2
  we denote the operation of convolution of two 
vectors followed by dyadic downsampling of the output. Also, 
we present the numerical values with three decimal numbers 
only due to the limited space of this paper. 
By analogue, we can use the flipped version of l (which 
would be a high-pass wavelet decomposition filter) denoted by 
h =
1 3 3 3 3 3 1 3
, , ,
4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
    
  
 
 to obtain detail 
coefficients at level 2: 
2d  = 2 2( )q l h    
  (–508.185, 15.587, 546.921,              
–315.680). 
According to the wavelet theory, every numerical array can 
be presented as the sum of its low-frequency component (at the 
last decomposition level) and a set of several high-frequency 
ones at each decomposition level (called approximation and 
details respectively). In general, the signal approximation and 
details can be obtained the following way (we will also 
substitute the values from our example): 
2A  = 2 2 2( )a l l    = (1369.821, 687.286, 244.677, 
41.992, –224.980, 11.373, 112.860, 79.481, 82.240, 175.643, 
244.757, 289.584, 340.918, 693.698, 965.706, 1156.942); 
1 2D D  = 1 22 2 2( )d h d h l       = (–1350.821,           
–675.286, –91.677, 29.008, 237.980, 67.627,                    
–105.860, –46.481, –66.240, 94.357, 567.243, –154.584, 
–99.918, –679.698, –905.706, 3180.058). 
To provide group anonymity (or, redistribute signal 
extremums, which is the same), we need to replace 
2A  with 
another approximation, such that the resultant signal (obtained 
when being summed up with our details 
1 2D D ) becomes 
different. Moreover, the only values we can try to alter are 
approximation coefficients. 
So, in general, we need to solve a corresponding 
optimization problem. Knowing the dependence between 
2A  
and 
2a  (which is pretty easy to obtain in our model example), 
we can set appropriate constraints, and obtain a solution 
2a  
which completely meets our requirements. 
For instance, we can set the following constraints: 
2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
0.637 (1) 0.137 (4) 1369.821;
0.296 (1) 0.233 (2) 0.029 (4) 687.286;
0.079 (1) 0.404 (2) 0.017 (4) 244.677;
0.137 (1) 0.637 (2) 224.980;
0.029 (1) 0.296 (2) 0.233
a a
a a a
a a a
a a
a a a
   
     
     
     
      2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2 2
(3) 11.373;
0.017 (1) 0.079 (2) 0.404 (3) 112.860;
0.012 (2) 0.512 (3) 79.481;
0.137 (2) 0.637 (3) 82.240;
0.029 (2) 0.296 (3) 0.233 (4) 175.643;
0.233 (1) 0.029 (3)
a a a
a a
a a
a a a
a a

     
    
    
      
   2
2 2 2
2 2
0.296 (4) 693.698;
0.404 (1) 0.017 (3) 0.079 (4) 965.706;
 0.512 (1) 0.012 (4)  1 156.942.
a
a a a
a a














   

      

   
 
The solution might be as follows: 2a  = (0, 379.097, 
31805.084, 5464.854). 
Now, let us obtain our new approximation 2A , and a new 
quantity signal q : 
2A  = 2 2 2( )a l l    = (–750.103, –70.090, 244.677, 
194.196, 241.583, 345.372, 434.049, 507.612, 585.225, 
1559.452, 2293.431, 2787.164, 3345.271, 1587.242, 449.819,  
–66.997); 
q  = 2 1 2A D D   = (–2100.924, –745.376, 153.000, 
223.204, 479.563, 413.000, 328.189, 461.131, 518.985, 
1653.809, 2860.674, 2632.580, 3245.352, 907.543, –455.887, 
3113.061). 
Two main problems almost always arise at this stage. As 
we can see, there are some negative elements in the modified 
goal signal. This is completely awkward. A very simple though 
quite adequate way to overcome this backfire is to add a 
reasonably big number (2150 in our case) to all signal 
elements. Obviously, the mean value of the signal will change. 
After all, these two issues can be solved using the following 
formula: *
modq  = 
16 16
1 1
( 2150) ( 2150)i i
i i
q q q
 
   
     
   
  . 
If to round *
modq  (since quantities have to be integers), we 
obtain the modified goal signal as follows: 
*
finq  = (6, 183, 300, 310, 343, 334, 323, 341, 348, 496, 654, 
624, 704, 399, 221, 686). 
The graphical representation is available in Fig. 1b. 
As we can see, the group anonymity problem at this point 
has been completely solved: all initial extremums persisted, 
and some new ones emerged. 
The last step of our algorithm (i.e., obtaining new microfile 
M
*
) cannot be shown in this paper due to evident space 
limitations. 
B. Concentration Group Anonymity Problem 
Now, let us take the same dataset we processed before. But, 
this time we will pick another goal mapping function. We will 
try to build up a concentration signal. 
According to (1), what we need to do first is to define what 
i  to choose. In our opinion, the whole quantity of males 18 to 
70 years of age would suffice. 
By completing necessary arithmetic operations, we finally 
obtain the concentration signal: 
c = (0.004, 0.002, 0.033, 0.009, 0.002, 0.012, 0.002, 0.007, 
0.001, 0.035, 0.058, 0.017, 0.030, 0.003, 0.004, 0.128). 
The graphical representation can be found in Fig. 2a. 
Let us perform all the operations we’ve accomplished 
earlier, without any additional explanations (we will reuse 
notations from the previous subsection): 
2a  = 2 2( )c l l    = (0.073, 0.023, 0.018, 0.059); 
2d  = 2 2( )c l h    = (0.003, –0.001, 0.036, –0.018); 
2A  = 2 2 2( )a l l    = (0.038, 0.025, 0.016, 0.011, 0.004, 
0.009, 0.010, 0.009, 0.008, 0.019, 0.026, 0.030, 0.035, 0.034, 
0.034, 0.037); 
1 2D D  = 1 22 2 2( )d h d h l       = (–0.034, –0.023, 
0.017, –0.002, –0.002, 0.003, –0.009, –0.002, –0.007, 0.016, 
0.032, –0.013, –0.005, –0.031, –0.030, 0.091). 
The constraints for this example might look the following 
way: 
 
a) 
 
b) 
Figure 1.  Initial (a) and modified (b) quantity signals. 
2 2
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2
0.637 (1) 0.137 (4) 0.038;
0.296 (1) 0.233 (2) 0.029 (4) 0.025;
0.079 (1) 0.404 (2) 0.017 (4) 0.016;
0.012 (1) 0.512 (2) 0.011;
0.137 (1) 0.637 (2) 0.005;
0.029 (1
a a
a a a
a a a
a a
a a
a
   
     
     
    
    
  2 2
2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2
2
) 0.296 (2) 0.233 (3) 0.009;
0.017 (1) 0.079 (2) 0.404 (3) 0.010;
0.012 (2) 0.512 (3) 0.009;
0.137 (2) 0.637 (3) 0.009;
0.029 (2) 0.296 (3) 0.233 (4) 0.019;
0.233
a a
a a a
a a
a a
a a a
a
    
     
    
    
      
 2 2
2 2 2
2 2
(1) 0.029 (3) 0.296 (4) 0.034;
0.404 (1) 0.017 (3) 0.079 (4) 0.034;
 0.512 (1) 0.012 (4)   0.037.
a a
a a a
a a









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One possible solution to this system is as follows: 
2a  = 
= (0, 0.002, 0.147, 0.025). 
We can obtain new approximation and concentration signal: 
2A  = 2 2 2( )a l l    = (–0.003, –0.000, 0.001, 0.001, 0.001, 
0.035, 0.059, 0.075, 0.093, 0.049, 0.022, 0.011, –0.004, 0.003, 
0.005, 0.000); 
c  = 2 1 2A D D   = (–0.037, –0.023, 0.018, –0.001,           
–0.002, 0.038, 0.051, 0.073, 0.086, 0.066, 0.054, –0.002,          
–0.009, –0.028, –0.026, 0.092). 
Once again, we need to make our signal non-negative, and 
fix its mean value. But, it is obvious that the corresponding 
quantity signal *modq  will also have a different mean value. 
Therefore, fixing the mean value can be done in “the quantity 
domain” (which we won’t present here). 
Nevertheless, it is possible to make the signal non-negative 
after all: 
 a) 
 
b) 
Figure 2.  Initial (a) and modified (b) concentration signals. 
*
modc  = 0.5c   = (0.463, 0.477, 0.518, 0.499, 0.498, 0.538, 
0.551, 0.573, 0.586, 0.566, 0.554, 0.498, 0.491, 0.472, 0.474, 
0.592). 
The graphical representation can be found in Fig. 2b. Once 
again, the group anonymity has been achieved. 
Once again, the last step to complete is to construct the 
modified M
*
, which we will omit in this paper. 
VI. SUMMARY 
In this paper, it is the first time that group anonymity 
problem has been thoroughly analyzed and formalized. We 
presented a generic mathematical model for group anonymity 
in microfiles, outlined the scheme for providing it in practice, 
and showed several real-life examples. 
As we think, there still remain some unresolved issues, 
some of them are as follows: 
1) Choosing data representation: There are still many more 
ways to pick convenient goal representation of initial data not 
covered in this paper. They might depend on some problem 
task definition peculiarities. 
2) Performing goal representation’s modification: It is 
obvious that the method discussed in Section V is not an 
exclusive one. There could be as well proposed other 
sufficient techniques to perform data modifications. For 
instance, choosing different wavelet bases could lead to 
yielding different outputs. 
3) Obtaining the modified microfile: There has to be 
developed computationally effective heuristics to perform 
inverse goal mapping. 
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